In empirical studies of sequential auctions of identical objects prices have been found to decline. We study three ascending price auctions of ancient Chinese porcelain recovered from shipwrecks, in which there are very long sequences of lots containing the same number of identical objects. In the three auctions different setups were used. We exploit these 'natural experiments' to examine whether some sequences generate more revenue than others. Our results point to the fact that a sequence of lots each of which contains the same numbers of items generates more revenue than lots with varying numbers of items. We also find that over a sequence of lots hammer prices decline and converge to some limit value, which is larger than the pre-sale estimate in the first two sales, and is equal to the pre-sale estimate in the third one. JEL codes: D44
Introduction
In this paper, we analyze sequential ascending auctions of shipwreck findings, organized by Christie's in Amsterdam in 1986, 1992 and 1995. Our interest is twofold. We first investigate whether some sequences generate larger revenue than others. We then turn to examine, as many others have done, whether in a sequence of auctions of identical items prices decline.
The data have two interesting characteristics, which fail to exist simultaneously in many other cases: the number of lots of identical objects is often quite large, and pre-sale estimates are available. Moreover, different setups are used, in which both the number of lots in parcels 1 and the number of items in sequential lots belonging to the same parcel is changed. In some sequences, this number is constant, in others it increases or decreases. Though the declining price anomaly is pervasive, these sales have a 'natural experiment' flavor that is used to examine whether some types of sequences generate more revenue than others.
Our contribution to the auction literature is empirical. We analyze data and interpret the results but do not present a formal model. As yet, multiunit auctions are not well understood from a theoretical point of view. We find that parcels that contain lots with the same number of items generate more revenue than parcels that contain lots with varying numbers of items. We conjecture that this is because constant quantity lots generate more competition. We also find declining prices in sequential lots to converge to the presale estimate and interpret this to be in line with the full-information content of the presale estimate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the three sales that are analyzed. Section 3 exploits the 'natural experiment' component of the three sales to infer whether some ways of organizing a parcel are 'better' than others. Section 4 deals with declining prices. We estimate an error-correction mechanism model, in which the sequence of hammer prices of lots in a parcel converges to some limit value that is almost equal to the pre-sale estimate. Section 5 draws some conclusions.
Characteristics of the sales
We analyze three sales of Chinese porcelain found in rescued ships that had sunk 150 to 300 years ago in the South China Sea. All three sales were organized by Christie's in Amsterdam using the usual mechanism of ascending auctions. In the first sale held in April-May 1986, over 100,000 pieces of blue and white porcelain (as well as gold ingots) were offered during several sessions which took about a week (from Monday April 28, to Friday May 2). These objects (including some 170 dinner services, 63,000 teacups and saucers, 600 vomit pots, etc.) came from the Nanking cargo, 2 chartered by the Dutch East India Company, en route from Nanking to Holland, and which contained some 700,000 pounds of tea, a much more valuable cargo than the china that was on board only to provide the weight necessary to 'balance' the ship. The contents of the shipwreck belonged to, and were sold by, Captain Hatcher who had discovered and salvaged the ship.
The second sale was organized a few years later, on April 7-8, 1992 . The objects auctioned during four sessions came from the recovery of another ship, the Vung Tau, 3 en route from Jakarta to Holland with 28,000 pieces of Chinese porcelain (decorative wares, such as vases). The contents of the ship belonged to the North-Vietnamese government.
The third sale, the Diana cargo was held on March 5-6, 1995. The 1,319 lots needed six sessions to be sold. The Diana was a ship licensed to trade between India and Canton, carrying cotton and opium to China and returning with porcelain to India. She sunk in 1817, off the coast of Malacca, and was salvaged in 1994 by Dorian Bell, managing director of a private company, the Malaysian Historical Salvors. The cargo contained over eleven tons of porcelain, 24,000 pieces, comprising 200 different shapes. Table 1 gives some general characteristics describing the three sales. The numbers that we show, and that we used in all our estimates concern parcels containing lots, with perfectly homogeneous items. 4 In case this was not clear enough from the sales catalogue (for instance if the pre-sale estimates were not identical over lots, or if the illustration made it clear that the quality 2 The name Nanking stems from the port of origin of the ship, the true name of which was probably Geldermalsen. 3 In this case the name stems from the town off the Vietnamese coast were the ship was found.
4 Table 1 does not include single item lots or lots with heterogeneous objects.
was not identical), the whole parcel was discarded. 5 A parcel is thus made of homogeneous quality lots and lots contain homogeneous quality objects.
The first sale consists of 86 parcels auctioned in 2,102 lots, leading to an average of 24.4 lots per parcel and an average number of 1,100 items per parcel. The other two sales are substantially smaller, with 6.5 and 11.8 lots per parcel, and a much smaller number of items per parcel. The first and the third sales feature a large number of cases with increases in the number of items between lots in a parcel, and only very few declines. In the second sale, there are many cases in which the number of items decreases between successive lots. On average, in the first auction there is a quantity increase of 7.3%, while in the second sale there is an average decline of 8.0% in the number of items. The middle part of Table 1 shows that there were both price increases and decreases, the latter dominating the former. The average price decline between two lots that follow each other within a parcel ranges from 4.0% in the first sale to 1.7% in the second one. The declines in the second and third sales are thus not as large as in the first one. The data in Table 1 show that there exist interesting differences between the three sales. In sales 1 and 3, lots within a parcel have a tendency to become larger: The number of items increases 269 times in sale 1 and 54 times in sale 3, while it decreases only 9 and 6 times. The reverse is observed in sale 2 (7 increases and 122 decreases). These differences can be exploited to check whether (a) changing the number of lots within a parcel, (b) changing the number of items across lots within a parcel, and (c) increasing or decreasing this number, may have different effects on the price decline. If so, then there may be possibilities to design multiple-object sales in order to maximize the revenue of the seller.
Organizing parcels
As will be seen in Section 4, the seller cannot avoid declining prices across subsequently auctioned lots within a parcel. One can nevertheless wonder whether he may exercise some control over the total revenue generated by a parcel. He faces three decisions:
(a) Set pre-sale estimates for an item (or for a lot). In most cases, prices of items in a parcel are identical, irrespective of the size of a lot in the parcel; prices vary only if the quality of items changes across lots; 6 (b) Choose in how many lots he will regroup the identical items; (c) Decide whether the lots in a parcel will contain the same number of items (e.g. 3 lots of 24 items each) or whether this number will vary (e.g. 12, 24 and 36), and if so, in which order the lots will be auctioned.
The seller knows Q i , the total number of items in parcel i. We assume that the pre-sale estimate p e i is based on the intrinsic value of the item, and is therefore also known before the two remaining decisions are made. We also assume that the number of lots is set first, and only then, the auctioneer decides on how the lots in a parcel will be organized. Therefore, we first look at decision (b), given Q i and p e i . The auctioneer has to strike a delicate balance between the number of lots (to save on the cost of the sale) and the price of a lot (to take into account the bidders' budget constraints). This leads to a model in which the average number of items q i in a lot i is explained by Q i and p e i . Since the three sales were organized differently, we also include dummies for sale 2 (d 2 ) and sale 3 (d 3 ). The equation reads:
Estimation results, reported in column (1) of Table 2 , are very satisfactory, since they explain some 77% of the variance of the average number of lots in the 284 parcels. Column (2) shows the parameter estimates if we also include quadratic terms of parcel quantity and presale estimate. This increases the explained variance to 86%. Column (1) shows that when the total number of items increases by one percent, the average lot size increases by 0.4%. This can be given an interpretation in terms of costs, since more lots need more time to sell. The results also show that, as expected, the number of items in a lot will decrease with the price of the item, as otherwise, lots may become too expensive. Since the quadratic term in Column (2) is positive, this effect is stronger for low pre-sale estimates. Finally, conditional on Q i and p e i , the average lot size is smaller in the first sale than in the two others.
As suggested by the numbers in Table 1 , the shapes of the three sales are quite different. If shapes matter, they should have an impact on the average price of a parcel, other things being held constant. We discarded twenty parcels containing lots in which the number of items was both increasing and decreasing from one lot to the next, and concentrate on those containing lots with only constant, only increasing or only decreasing number of items.
7 This led us to the numbers reported in Table 3 , which make apparent that Christie's did run some experiments. In particular, the proportion of parcels containing lots with identical number of items ('constant' in Table 3 ) increases from 17% in sale 1 to 48% in sale 2 and 68% in sale 3. This suggests that the seller must have noted that constant quantity lots raise more revenue.
To verify this assumption, we estimate equations in which p i , the average hammer price of lots in parcel i, is explained by the pre-sale estimate p e i and the shape of the lots, captured here by a dummy variable (cld) that takes the value one for parcels in which all lots contain the same number of items. The equation is specified as:
The results reported in Table 4 , point to two conclusions that are present in all our equations. First, the coefficient of the pre-sale estimate variable p e i is always significantly smaller than one. Second, the constant quantity dummy always picks a positive coefficient, though the coefficient is not significantly different from zero at the usual 5% level in two cases. The three sales can however be pooled, 8 and the coefficient turns then out to be significantly positive. This suggests that parcels that contain lots with the same number of items (say, 24, 24, 24) pick average hammer prices that are some 30% larger than other, 'non constant' parcels (12, 24, 36) .
9 This is consistent with Christie's behavior to increase, over time, the number of constant quantity lots. Note that the coefficient of the sale 3 dummy variable is significantly negative which indicates that the hype that was present in the first 2 sales was over. Finally, note that in the pooled regression, we added the variable T i , the total number of lots in parcel i, which hardly has a significant effect (0.3% per lot).
10
The fact that lots with the same number of items do better is counterintuitive. Indeed, one may think that if buyers are heterogeneous (some willing to buy more than others), it should be better to vary the number of items, since this will generate more competition for each (differentiated) lot. This is obviously not the case, and leads us to conjecture that this points to a relationship between organization of the sale and competition between potential buyers. If during the sale of a parcel, the number of items per lot increases the number of bidders decreases as some of them are only interested in small quantities, and the hammer price is likely to decrease. The reverse happens if the number of items per lot decreases. Then, the number of bidders in the beginning of the auction is small and increases later on. Provided that the size of the lot is sufficiently small to make it interesting for many potential buyers constant quantity lots attract more bidders. Therefore, we conjecture that constant quantity lots generate, on average, more competition, and therefore, more revenue. 
Declining prices
The declining price anomaly has been observed and studied many times and for very different auction mechanisms (English second price auctions, Dutch auctions in which the bid price falls until a bidder stops the auction, etc.) and various items that appear at auction, such as livestock (Buccola, 1982) , wool (Burns, 1985) , wines (Ashenfelter, 1989 , McAfee and Vincent, 1993 , Ginsburgh, 1998 , prints (Pesando and Shum, 1996) , or flowers (van den Berg et al., 2001). The same observation holds for heterogeneous objects, such as flats (Ashenfelter and Genesove, 1992) , jewelry (Chanel, Gérard-Varet and Vincent, 1996) , paintings (Beggs and Graddy, 1997), used cars (Raviv, 2004) , or rare books (Deltas and Kosmopoulou, 2004) .
Auction theory suggests that prices for identical objects follow a martingale, when lots are sold in sequence, 12 but several explanations have been 10 The coefficient is not significantly different from zero in the other equations. given for declining prices also. 13 Most of the theoretical results are obtained for constant quantity lots (often a unique item) of homogeneous objects.
As indicated in the introduction, Christie's data have two interesting characteristics: large numbers of lots containing identical objects and existence of pre-sale estimates. The number of identical lots examined in livestock (Buccola, 1982) , wool (Burns, 1985) Deltas and Kosmopoulou, 2004) and make the declining price anomaly more difficult to detect. Wine auctions are also different. Though they contain lots with the same wine, vintage and château, the number of items in lots often varies, and the sequential effect is entangled with the varying quantity effect. Here, we concentrate our attention on parcels, that consist in a sequence of lots, each of which contains the same number of fully identical items (constant quantity lots), with identical pre-sale estimates, but we also controlled as much as we could to include homogeneous lots only. We avoid thus two causes of heterogeneity, where the price decline may be contaminated by other factors: heterogeneity of items in lots as well as non-constant number of objects in lots that belong to the same parcel. Table 5 gives a breakdown of parcels which contain constant quantity lots. In sales 1, 2 and 3 for example, there are respectively 0, 20 and 7 parcels each of which contains two lots. As can be seen, there are 24 parcels that contain ten or more lots, which is quite infrequent in other sales (with the exception of flower auctions).
All three sales, especially the first one, were big hypes (see Beckett, 1995, pp. 91-104), and this obviously sheds some doubt about the 'real' value of the china, which sold for five to ten times over pre-sale estimates. In the second sale for example, a dinner service estimated at £1,500 sold for £3,000. Two days later, the dealer who had bought the vessel sold it for £7,000, bought it back a week later for £15,000 and sold it for twice that price. Today, it might fetch £4,000-5,000.
14 Table 6 sheds some light on these observations. While the ratio 'hammer price/pre-sale estimate" 15 was 8.3 in the first sale, it dropped to 5.5 and 2.0 in the second and third sales. The second part of the table gives some insight on the distribution of this ratio. In the first sale, all the lots reached hammer prices that were larger than the pre-sale estimate (and the lowest relative hammer price is 60 percent above the presale estimate), and 77.5 percent of the lots reached a hammer price that was more than four times larger than the pre-sale estimate. This percentage drops to 48 percent in the second sale and to 10 percent in the last sale. This shows either that Christie's learnt how to set more reasonable pre-sale estimates for objects that were quite unusual the first time they appeared, or that bidders became more aware of the 'true' value. One should treat this interpretation with some caution, however, as it is based on the results of observations from three auction sales.
Declining prices seem to be the rule. 16 However, the size of the price change may depend on particular situations, such as the total number of lots in a parcel, on whether a lot is auctioned in the beginning or in the end of the parcel, on whether the price of the last auctioned lot was above or below the pre-sale estimate.
Our aim is not to give new explanations to the declining price phenomenon, but to capture its dynamics. The basic idea is that, in equilibrium, that is, if the number of lots in a sequence were large enough, the hammer price should be equal to the pre-sale estimate. Indeed, if the salesroom is rational, it should reveal all the information it has and provide an unbiased 14 See The Art Newspaper 107, p. 66 (October 2000). 15 Christie's gives a range for the pre-sale estimate. We define the 'pre-sale estimate' by the geometric mean of the extremities of the range. 16 Estimates of the decline based on a simple model lnp i,t = µ i + ρt, where p i,t represents the hammer price of the t-th lot of the sequence in parcel i, the µ i are parcel fixed effects, and t is the location of the lot in a parcel, lead to the following estimates for ρ: Sale 1: ρ = −0.027 (t = 2.3), 71 observations; Sale 2: ρ = −0.010 (t = 2.9), 311 observations and Sale 3: ρ = −0.019 (t = 15.8), 476 observations. Estimates based on first differences lead to similar (price decline) results. These numbers differ from those given in Table 1 which gives average price declines for all parcels. Here, we deal with constant quantity lots only.
pre-sale estimate. This argument is made formal in Milgrom and Weber (1982) who show that in most auction models -first-price, second-price and English auctions -"honesty is the best policy" for the seller in the absence of reserve prices. It is also shown that the seller can adjust the reserve price so that the "honesty result" will continue to hold. One should also expect that all the information available to the salesroom is reflected in the pre-sale estimates. Therefore, we posit that in equilibrium (for t large enough),
where p i,t is the hammer price of the t-th lot of the sequence in a parcel i, p e i , is the pre-sale estimate of every lot in parcel i, u i,t is a white noise error term, γ 0 and γ 1 are parameters. If honesty is the best policy, log γ 0 and γ 1 should be equal to zero and one, respectively. Equation (3) is written to make it possible for log γ 0 to be different from zero, if the sequence of hammer prices does not converge to the pre-sale estimate. Given the data in Table 6 , this is likely to be so for Sales 1 and 2, in which case the equilibrium price will be (log γ 0 + log p e i ) instead of log p e i . However, hammer prices may deviate from the equilibrium value, due to several factors, such as t, the location of the lot in a parcel, T i , the total number of lots in a parcel i as well as price dynamics. 17 We model this as an error-correction mechanism, assuming that the price adjustment between two consecutive lots in a parcel depends on u i,t−1 , the previous deviation from the equilibrium value. These observations lead very naturally to the following model: ∆ log p i,t = β 1 (log p i,t−1 − γ 1 (log γ 0 + log p e i )) + β 2 log T i + β 3 log t + v i,t , (4) where the β k , k = 1, 3 are parameters, and v i,t is an error term. The parameter β 1 should be negative if an error-correction mechanism is at work, so that transitory deviations are corrected and brought back to the equilibrium value. Note that there is no intercept term in (4), since it is impossible to estimate γ 0 and an intercept if all the parameters in (4) are estimated in a single step. In that case, it is easy to check that the intercept term can be recovered as −β 1 γ 1 log γ 0 .
17 Sample selection may be one reason that the observed hammer prices are on average greater than the average estimate because items that go unsold because of low hammer prices are left out of the sample. However, in our dataset this is not an issue as less than 0.6% of the lots went unsold.
It is well-known that if the observations were drawn from a time-series, some (co)integration relations should be satisfied for this model to provide an unbiased view of the true mechanism. In particular, ∆ log p i,t and (log p i,t−1 − γ 1 (log γ 0 + log p e i )) should be stationary. 18 In our case, these are assumptions that cannot be verified, given the nature of the data, which contain several sequences of 'time-series' consisting of lots in each specific parcel. Therefore, we are simply led to estimate model (4) using ordinary least squares. Results are given in Table 7 and lead to the following comments.
(a) As expected, and because the pre-sale estimates in sales 1 and 2 were obviously too low (or because the sales turned out to be hypes), prices do not converge to pre-sale estimates. Indeed, the intercepts that appear in the long-run relationships (γ 0 ) are both significantly different from zero. This is not so for sale 3. Note that γ 0 declines while γ 1 gets closer to 1 as the three sales unwind. This suggests that both Christie's and bidders have gained experience from the first two sales.
(b) The coefficient for the error correction mechanism (β 1 ) is negative, as it should, and significantly different from zero.
(c) For Sale 3, the coefficient picked by the pre-sale estimate in the longrun relation (γ 1 ) is not significantly different from one, and the intercept log γ 0 is not significantly different from zero.
(d) The negative sign of the coefficient on the 'Number of items in a parcel' variable (β 2 ) implies that the price decline is slightly faster for larger parcels.
(e) The positive sign of the coefficient on the 'Location of the lot in a parcel' variable (β 3 ) indicates that once account is taken for the other effects, price decreases (resp. increases) between successive lots are smaller (resp. larger) the closer one gets to the last lots in a parcel.
It is of interest to test whether the restrictions γ 0 = 1, γ 1 = 1, β 2 = −β 3 are supported by the data. The two first restrictions correspond to testing whether pre-sale estimates are unbiased predictions of hammer prices. The last restrictions tests whether T i and t, the two other variables of interest in the short-run dynamics of equation (4) can be replaced by a single variable (log T i −log t), which measures the "distance" between the lot being auctioned and the last lot of a parcel, or the number of lots of a parcel that are still to be auctioned. Therefore, we also test the joint hypothesis H 0 : γ 0 = 1, γ 1 = 1, β 2 = −β 3 . If accepted, this leads to the following simpler model:
The F -statistics for both tests appear in the lower part of Table 7 . They show that the restriction is accepted for Sale 3 only (the tabulated value is equal to 3 at the 5 per cent level). The negative sign of the error correction mechanism parameter is the one that is expected. It is unclear what the sign of the parameter picked by (log T i − log t) should be. At any rate, though almost significantly different from 0 at the 5 per cent probability level, this coefficient is extremely small. For Sale 3, it is equal to 0.01, implying that the effect on the hammer price difference between two successive lots is small, once account is taken of the distance between the actual and the equilibrium hammer price. We also ran a two-step procedure, estimating (3) by OLS first, and using the residuals from (3) to estimate (4). The results are qualitatively equivalent to the one-step procedure described earlier.
All in all our parameter estimates indicate that prices decline over a sequence of lots of identical items. The price decline is slightly faster for larger parcel and -most important -the price decline between two successive lots is smaller the closer one gets to the last lots in a parcel. The prices converge to some limit value which is almost equal to the pre-sale estimate.
Conclusions
In this paper three ascending auctions of ancient Chinese porcelain recovered from shipwrecks are studied. We focus on two issues. We investigate whether some sequences generate higher revenues than others, and, more traditionally we check whether in a sequence of auctions of identical items prices decline.
We analyze a large number of some very long sequences (parcels) of auctions of lots including varying quantities of identical items. It looks as if the seller could exercise some control over the sequence of prices and, consequently, on the total revenue of a parcel, by deciding on the number of lots, on the number of items in each lot as well as on the changes in the number of items across lots. It is hard to assess the influence of the pre-sale estimate. The only reasonable assumption is that it represents the fundamental value of the item, and is not set strategically. It appears that the number of lots in a parcel has almost no influence on the average price. The only important effect is generated by the number of items in a lot. Parcels in which lots contain the same number of items generate more revenue. This was indeed the strategy followed by Christie's since, over time, the salesroom decided to increase the proportion of such lots.
In the first two sales the pre-sale price estimates provided by the auctioneer were substantially below hammer prices. In the third one, prices were closer to pre-sale estimates, suggesting that this sale was representative of a normal sequential auction, though prices also declined over the sequence of lots. Our analysis shows that once the price of the first lot is set, prices of successive lots follow the path of an error correction model and ultimately converge to the presale estimate.
In conclusion, we reach two interesting results that are new to the small empirical literature on sequential auctions. First, we find that constant quantity lots generate higher revenue. Second, we find that over a sequence of lots prices decline and converge to some equilibrium value (the pre-sale estimate in the third sale). We present no formal model to explain our finding since as yet multi-unit auctions are not well understood. Instead, we provide an intuitive interpretation of our results. We conjecture that the revenue result is attributed to constant quantity lots generating more competition, while the convergence of declining prices to some equilibrium value is in line with the full-information content of the presale estimate. The dependent variable is ln q i , the (log of the) average number of items in a lot of parcel i. The t-statistics which appear between parentheses under the coefficients, are based on robust regression techniques. Twenty parcels that appear in Table 1 have been discarded, since they contained lots with both increasing and decreasing number of items. The dependent variable is ln p i , the (log of the) price of a standardized lot in each parcel; we chose as standard lot in the parcel the one that contained the smallest number of items. The t-statistics which appear between brackets under the coefficients, are based on robust regression techniques. t-statistics are given between brackets under the coefficients. r means H 0 is rejected at the 5% probability level; a means H 0 is not rejected.
